John Dunn Interview by John Dunn & Ivan Cerovac
133
Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. XX, No. 59, 2020
John Dunn Interview
Ivan Cerovac: You are considered one of the fi nest experts in John 
Locke’s political though. What drove you to this research topic? What 
sparked your interest in political philosophy in general, and what at-
tracted you to Locke’s political writings?
John Dunn: I was not initially drawn to Locke himself through any 
direct personal attraction. I was born in Britain in the second year of 
the Second World War and had become keenly interested in politics 
before I got to University because of idiosyncratic family experience in 
Germany, Iran and India. I have been deeply preoccupied with politics 
ever since because I knew already by then that the stakes in politics 
for everyone are always vast, the situation of most human beings then 
alive in the world hazardous and often painful, and that the chances 
of its improving seriously were, as they remain, largely at the mercy of 
politics. I recognized quite young that my parents’ vision of politics was 
in many ways unreal and absurd, and since I loved them and admired 
many things about them, I wished with some intensity to learn to see 
politics for myself more clearly and steadily, without illusion and with-
out self-serving. Through a series of whimsical pieces of good fortune I 
have spent my very privileged life in trying to learn how to.
I was drawn initially to philosophy because I hoped it would show 
me how to see everything which mattered to me clearly and because for 
someone arriving in Cambridge at that point, in the lingering aura of 
Wittgenstein, philosophy still held the imaginative glamour to make 
that fond hope almost plausible. I was drawn to political philosophy a 
year or two later, and as a student of History, because I hoped espe-
cially that it would show me how to see politics steadily in that way.
After I had completed my undergraduate degree in History I de-
cided to go on to undertake doctoral research in the history of politi-
cal thought hoping to do so under the supervision of the inspiration-
al teacher who had introduced me in my fi nal year to the thought of 
the Scottish Enlightenment and in particular to that of David Hume 
and Adam Smith. I intended the dissertation I hoped to write to be on 
Hume’s understanding of political obligation, which I felt was woefully 
insuffi cient, despite the dazzling intelligence of his vision as a whole. 
I wanted to understand why he had come to see that understanding 
as suffi cient: to rethink his thoughts at this point as deeply as I could 
in the hope of somehow seeing beneath them and through them how 
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to understand the political bonds which hold (or fail to hold) a society 
together more clearly.
The teacher in question, Duncan Forbes, was a fi gure of arresting 
intuition, strong passions, but less capacity for calm and intellectual 
composure. He was wrestling with Hume’s thinking himself at the 
time and working towards his important study of Hume’s Philosophi-
cal Politics (1975). The last thing he wanted was an ignorant and over-
confi dent graduate students stumbling around in his vicinity, so he 
passed me smartly on to Peter Laslett, a very different fi gure, fl am-
boyant, charming, enthusiastic and very much at home in the world. 
Laslett had just published his path-breaking edition of Locke’s Two 
Treatises of Government, which demonstrated that these were written 
not to vindicate a Revolution which had already occurred but to jus-
tify revolutionary resistance to the government of Charles II. Laslett 
wished me to trace the impact of the Two Treatises in Britain, France 
and North America over the century following its publication as a path-
way towards two later Revolutions, in France and North America, and 
a third potential revolution in Britain itself, which did not in fact oc-
cur. I studied this for three years but found that impact over most of 
the century, except perhaps in one or two specifi c ways in the run up 
to American Independence, shallower than was widely alleged, and not 
worth systematic presentation as a book. Whilst doing the research 
I had, however, also seen something I thought was really important 
about Locke’s own thinking and it was that to which I devoted my fi rst 
book and my unsuccessful submission for a doctorate. I still think the 
central perception of that book was right, as have a variety of other 
scholars since. It was that Locke’s overall vision of politics and its place 
in human life depended for him on a Christian Weltanschauung and 
that his main arguments, as he said explicitly himself whilst he was in 
a position to do so, do not hold good without it. A lot of the subsequent 
intellectual history of the west and much of the global political vulner-
ability of liberalism as a political approach today has followed from 
that fact. 
IC: Many hold that your work in the 1960s, along with that of Skinner 
and Pocock, fundamentally changed how political philosophers read 
some of the most important past political thinkers. What was wrong 
with the political philosophy in 1960s and what methodological pre-
scriptions did you suggest in order to improve the reading of classics 
such as Locke?
JD: I am afraid that I don’t think it is true that the work of Pocock, 
Skinner and myself has changed anything much in how political phi-
losophers read important past political thinkers, though one or two ma-
jor fi gures like John Rawls have made polite concessions to the need 
for a measure of historical accuracy in understanding the views of past 
thinkers they continue to take seriously. I remain confi dent that it 
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would still be better for the historical turn to have more of an impact 
in that respect.
It is unsurprising that my own work should have had little impact 
to that effect, but Skinner and Pocock are both scholars of extraordi-
nary ability, immense depth of knowledge and each has produced since 
an oeuvre of enormous distinction and range which should extend the 
political imagination of any philosopher who chose to take politics seri-
ously. I see no pressing need for any political philosophy which does not 
take politics seriously and consider it simply a misnomer.
Political philosophy in the Anglophone world was at a low ebb in the 
early 1960s, apart perhaps from Herbert Hart’s philosophy of law, and 
university teaching on the history of political ideas or political philoso-
phy as a whole was parochial, unrelentingly self-referential and rather 
smug.
Skinner and I were friends, and also at that time close intellectual 
companions. What united our view of the limitations of our elders (and 
Oxford contemporaries) was the sense that they were seeing and think-
ing within an extraordinarily narrow range and learning very little 
from the texts they happened to study. We thought they were doing so 
because they were failing to recognize the drastic existential sources 
of the works in question or take in what their authors were doing in 
bothering to write them at all, and hence often even to recognize what 
those authors intended to argue. We thought that this amply sustained 
habit was foolish and self-harming.
As already said, I still think that what I saw about Locke himself 
fi fty years and more ago was accurate and important; but it is only fair 
to acknowledge that seeing it did not at that point improve the politi-
cal discernment of my own reading of his political works. It has taken 
some time for me to recognize quite how deeply Locke thought into the 
fundamental elements of politics, the resources through which human 
communities can live relatively benignly together in face of its hazards, 
and the always limited reserves of patience and generosity in their feel-
ings towards one another. It was not until I came to register the politi-
cal insight of his insistence on the centrality of trust (and distrust) in 
human life, and the discomfi ting strains on mutual tolerance inherent 
in the unease with which human beings experience one another that 
I really saw how far in advance in these respects he remains of any of 
today’s leading philosophers of politics. Who, setting out from the text 
of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice could begin to imagine a world distantly 
resembling the world in which all of us are now living? But that is the 
world which has been made by politics and the world in which human 
beings must continue to live and die. I am not an enemy of intellec-
tual division of labour and I do not think that philosophers should turn 
themselves into historians. I simply think that any philosopher today 
who hopes to do political philosophy of real value needs both to open 
their imaginations fully to the realities of politics today and to call on 
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the aid of historians when they try to learn from the great political 
philosophers of the past.
IC: Political philosophers throughout history, as well as today, often 
construct political systems designed for citizens understood as rational 
and well-informed individuals. Nonetheless, empirical research sug-
gests that citizens often lack the basic understanding not only of the 
political process, but also of their own interests. The rise of populist poli-
ticians and movements, often related to fake news and anti-science (or 
anti-experts) movements, evokes worries that political philosophy has 
little to say about real-world politics. What are your thoughts on this? Is 
there a way for political philosophy to address these modern trends and 
to help us change the world for the better?
JD: All citizens are only intermittently rational and incompletely in-
formed. Any political philosophy premised on assuming otherwise can 
scarcely hope to illuminate politics.
As already indicated, I believe that any serious political philosopher 
must focus on politics as it is and think with and for their fellow citi-
zens or fellow human beings as these too are.
IC: You have written extensively on the politics of socialism and the 
(quite dangerous) Marxist hope that new social, political and economic 
structures will end the exploitation and lead to a better future. Though 
still far from Marxism, we are witnessing the rise in support for some 
populist left-wing politicians and social movements that presume that 
they are acting in the interest of the majority of people. Should left-wing 
parties appeal to (weak or modest) Marxist argumentation when they 
criticize the existing inequalities and offer solutions, or should the left 
abandon Marxism and start anew?
JD: Marx himself did see, and many Marxist political actors and think-
ers in his wake have since seen, many aspects of collective human life 
quite realistically. The deep failing of Marxism as a political heuristic 
has been its absurd promise of a world beyond politics which History 
would somehow in the end deliver, the opportunistic reach for power 
vindicated by that claim, and the grotesque underestimate of the du-
rable harm infl icted on any human society by decades of brutal oppres-
sion under the aegis of that claim. The left should keep from Marxism 
what is descriptively true and disavow completely what was always 
fantastical and is now brazenly mendacious.
IC: In one of your recent books, Setting the People Free, you focus on the 
story of democracy and how the word changed its meaning from Ancient 
Greece to contemporary western societies. There, you make a careful dis-
tinction between democracy as an electoral instrument and the democ-
ratization process. Can you explain this distinction and explain why do 
you think it pushed democracy in the political mainstream?
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JD: Ostensibly free elections on the basis of universal suffrage have be-
come the canonical form for establishing and sustaining legitimate gov-
ernment within a single historical sequence. They have done so largely 
because they provide a more compelling picture of how a population 
can authorize and de-authorize its government than any extant rival. 
The original experience of democracy as a political form provided for 
the relatively narrow ranks of free citizens a far more direct relation 
between governing and being governed than any modern state could 
replicate. For the citizens themselves, it lifted the burden of personal 
subjection from their lives. Democratization is a far vaguer process of 
lightening the burdens of subjection across a population which has pro-
ceeded to varying degrees across many different societies over the last 
few centuries and has sometimes been consciously and quite effectively 
steered through political action. It will never be complete, but it is a 
denser existential transformation than any modifi cation of the process 
of government could possibly be.
IC: Democracy is, if I understand your position well, a way to think 
politics together. Do you think that we are in a danger of losing that way 
of thinking temporarily, or even permanently? Is democracy something 
that can be forgotten and then recovered? What are the conditions under 
which people understand their living together politically in democratic 
terms?
JD: Democratic politics in that sense is a historical creation and it 
has to be created through political action, though it of course relies 
throughout on many social and economic preconditions. I believe it to 
be a creation of great value but also of ineliminable vulnerability. At 
present it is being wounded, deliberately and pretty brutally and ef-
fectively, in many different settings. Making room for it requires high 
political strategy and luck, but democratic politics itself must consist 
in the actions of very much wider circles of a population. It must make 
some sense to them and it must on balance benefi t, not harm, them. 
In the hands of the unscrupulous and malign it is very easy for high 
politics to take away what only it could make the space for in the fi rst 
place. Above all it requires a people (a demos) with the will and ca-
pacity to live together in peace. As any resident of former Yugoslavia 
knows all too well, high politics can destroy that fast and thoroughly. 
It cannot make it either fast or thoroughly. You could say only History 
can make it, but it would be better simply to recognize that it has to 
make itself and do so in time.
IC: There seems to be a rise of illiberal democracies in the world. Apart 
from China and Russia, more and more European countries (with Hun-
gary and Poland as notable examples) reject the liberal political tra-
dition and embrace simple majoritarianism reinforced by shared reli-
gious or ethnic identity. Why is this the case? How do you see the future 
of global democracy? Will it continue to be intertwined with liberalism 
or will it make an illiberal turn?
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JD: I don’t think liberalism is a clear political category, any more than 
democracy. In those societies which have had the historical opportu-
nity to develop democratic politics and experience it for some time I 
think it has had a liberalizing effect on the society over time and has 
in practice done so to some degree by now across a very wide range of 
cultures across the world from Taiwan, South Korea and even Japan 
to Uruguay. Illiberal residues remain very large in all societies and in 
many it is obviously wrong to view as residual since they constitute a 
substantial majority of the population. Where they do the freest and 
fairest of elections will not hand power to liberals and the prospects 
for establishing democratic politics or sustaining it for any length of 
time are poor. There is good reason to describe Hungary as an illiberal 
democracy, above and beyond the fact that its present and frequently 
re-elected leader chooses to do so. There is less reason to describe any 
state in which the rulers simply authorize themselves as a democracy 
at all. I doubt if democracies which it is reasonable to call liberal, where 
they happen to exist, are in much danger of being supplanted wholesale 
by any other state form so far invented, though they might of course 
be subjugated militarily in some way or other. What may destroy them 
from within is the failure of their democratic politics, but that neces-
sarily will have to be a failure of the citizens themselves. Democracy is 
not a providential form. It is a collective opportunity for citizens to use 
or squander.
